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Abstract
Collaborative work often benefits from having teams or organizations
with heterogeneous members. In this paper, we present a method to form
such diverse teams from people arriving sequentially over time. We define
a monotone submodular objective function that combines the diversity
and quality of a team and propose an algorithm to maximize the ob-
jective while satisfying multiple constraints. This allows us to balance
both how diverse the team is and how well it can perform the task at
hand. Using crowd experiments, we show that, in practice, the algorithm
leads to large gains in team diversity. Using simulations, we show how to
quantify the additional cost of forming diverse teams and how to address
the problem of simultaneously maximizing diversity for several attributes
(e.g. country of origin, gender). Our method has applications in collab-
orative work ranging from team formation, the assignment of workers to
teams in crowdsourcing, and reviewer allocation to journal papers arriving
sequentially. Our code is publicly accessible for further research.
1 Introduction
Collaborative work often benefits from having teams or organizations with di-
verse backgrounds and experiences [1]. For example, studies have suggested that
there is a positive relationship between diversity in a firm’s knowledge base and
its capability to innovate [2]. A large-scale study by Mckinsey [3] looked at the
relationship between the level of diversity (defined as a greater share of women
and a more mixed ethnic/racial composition in the leadership of large compa-
nies) and company financial performance. They found that the companies in
the top quartile of gender diversity were 15 percent more likely to have financial
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Figure 1: Bipartite graph of people arriving sequentially and teams requiring
two workers each. People belong to two groups here (orange for p1, p2, p5 and
blue for p3, p4, p6). Team t1 is matched to two people from different groups
while team t2 and t3 are so far matched only to one person each.
returns that were above their national industry median. Companies in the top
quartile of racial/ethnic diversity were 30 percent more likely to have financial
returns above their national industry median. Firms or teams with employee
diversity are often considered to be more competitive since such teams make
the firm more open towards new ideas [4]—for example, by increasing a firm’s
knowledge base and interaction between different competencies. As the cultural,
educational and ethnic backgrounds among employees become more diverse, so
does the knowledge base of the firm.
However, forming and maintaining diverse and high-quality teams over time
can be challenging, in large part because people (whether in traditional firms
or online collaborative groups) join and leave the firm sequentially, over time,
rather than as one large cohort or pool. In contrast, if we knew ahead of
time exactly when and who would be available to join different teams, then the
problem reduces to the easier mathematical problem of static bipartite matching:
that is assigning a set of resources (people, in this case) to a set of tasks/groups
(teams, in this case). If different people were better suited for some teams or
tasks over others (say, they had a certain skill that was highly valued for a
given team’s task), then this is called weighted bipartite matching, such that we
assign people to teams such that the assignment maximizes the overall weight (or
quality) of the matching. In practice, people can often be assigned to multiple
teams or collaborative projects at the same time, up to some upper and lower
limits (say, maximum of b number of teams per person), which is referred to as
weighted b-matching. The widely-studied weighted b-matching problem occurs
in all cases where a finite set of resources (e.g., people, computers, vehicles) needs
to be matched to another finite set of resources (e.g., teams, tasks, trips) like
team-formation and scientific peer-review (assigning people to review papers).
For collaborative work, we must handle two additional constraints not con-
sidered together by past matching approaches:
1. We do not know ahead of time exactly which future people will be available
and need to decide at the moment whether to assign a newly arrived person
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to a team—i.e., we must match people to teams in real-time rather than
waiting to collect a pool of people and then matching everyone in that
pool to teams in an offline fashion; and
2. We want to encourage matching a diverse subset of people to teams—e.g.,
teams where people are not only well-matched to the task but also have
complementary expertise or relevant but different viewpoints.
We refer to this as real-time, diverse, weighted b-matching. Figure 1 shows
an illustration of this problem with three teams and people belonging to two
groups. This setting is particularly important in practical implementations of
collaborative work, where teams of people are formed to solve problems together.
Without real-time matching, for example, if one waits to match people to teams
offline (e.g., by collecting a pool of people before assigning teams), then team
starvation or worker retention issues arise where teams may sit dormant without
progress or workers may leave while you wait to assign people to the teams. The
problem of real-time diverse matching arises in many disciplines and problems,
including: matching workers to firms [5], children to schools [6, 7], reviewers
to manuscripts [8, 9], donor organs to patients [10, 11] and residents to public
housing [12]. Specifically, this paper contributes to the following:
1. We show how to formulate the real-time diverse bipartite b-matching prob-
lem as an optimization problem and demonstrate how our general formu-
lation resolves, as a special case, to real-time person-to-team matching.
2. We present a simple approximation algorithm for performing real-time
diverse matching.
3. We demonstrate that the empirical performance of our simple, greedy
allocation not only satisfies theoretical results but is often surprisingly
close to optimal, in practice, on a variety of tasks including simulated test
cases with known optima, and via Amazon Mechanical Turk experiments.
To enable practitioners to deploy this method for their own domain, we have
provided the source code1 and encourage interested readers to use it.
2 Related Work
Matching people to form diverse teams leverages the intersection of two past
areas of research: the role of team diversity in collaborative work (§2.1) and how
resource diversity is measured and used to form teams (§2.2). In the context of
this past work, this paper provides a practical, simple-to-implement, and high-
performing method to perform diverse, real-time, b-matching that can enable
diverse team formation when unknown people arrive sequentially over time.
2.1 Diversity in teams
Building effective teams is often defined as “helping a work group become more
effective in accomplishing its tasks and satisfying the needs of group mem-
1https://github.com/IDEALLab/onlinematching
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bers” [13]. Prior research has explored what constitutes a successful team [14],
how teams develop [15], and how different selection criteria and competencies
might lead a team to excel [16]. For example, effective teams may need di-
verse knowledge and skills[17, 18, 19], workers’ attitudes, personalities [20] and
emotional intelligence [21]. Team Diversity can include both task-related diver-
sity (e.g., functional expertise, education, and organizational tenure) as well as
bio-demographic diversity (e.g., age, gender, and race/ethnicity). Task-related
diversity has been reported to have a positive impact on team performance
[22, 23, 3] although bio-demographic diversity is shown not to be significantly
related to team performance [24].
Non-diverse teams often emphasize on consensus-seeking behavior, which can
result in suboptimal decision making, such as Groupthink [25]. Team diversity
can often circumvent this by bringing in differing perspectives and promoting
healthy debates and dissents [26] with limited to no decrease in performance
(e.g., [27]). For example, increased cognitive diversity can increase performance
on complex and non-routine tasks [28, 29]. In contrast, other researchers have
argued for the benefits of homogeneous (non-diverse) teams which can include
increased team cohesion and performance on certain tasks [30].
In relation to that body of work, this paper provides an algorithm for or-
ganizations to control to what extent they wish to incorporate or emphasize
various types of diversity when matching workers to teams.
2.2 Measuring diversity and matching teams
While researchers have found benefits to encouraging team diversity (cognitive,
task-based, etc.), one open question lies in how to rigorously and scalably form
teams (or, equivalently, match people to teams) to achieve that diversity. To
do this, we first need to understand two areas of related research: (1) how
is diversity measured and 2) how can one use those measures to form diverse
teams?
Past researchers have measured diversity by defining some notion of cover-
age—that is, a diverse set should covers the space of available variation. Math-
ematically, researchers have done so via the use of submodular functions, which
encode the notion of diminishing returns [31, 32]; that is, as one adds items
to a set that are similar to previous items, one gains less utility if the existing
items in the set already “cover” the characteristics added by that new item. For
example, many previous diversity metrics used in the informational retrieval or
search communities—including Maximum Marginal Relevance (MMR) [33], ab-
sorbing random walks [34], subtopic retrieval [35] and Determinantal Point Pro-
cesses (DPP) [36]—are instances of submodular functions. These functions can
model notions of coverage, representation, and diversity [37] and they achieve
the best results to date on common automatic document summarization bench-
marks—e.g., at the Document Understanding Conference [31, 32].
Once one has an appropriate function for measuring diversity, one now has
to use that function to form diverse teams. Wilde et al. [38] proposed that
diversity of a team can be measured by a count of the number of unique affinity
4
groups present in the team. They provided a practical method to form teams
based on the cognitive patterns of people in a personnel pool. However, their
approach uses a diversity measure (which is similar to the Richness measure
used in ecology) that does not account for affinity group variations within a
team. Their heuristic approach does not simultaneously maximize quality and
diversity, and cannot scale to cases with thousands of participants. While fully
automated team formation algorithms have recently emerged to place people
together in socially networked environments [39, 40], past approaches do not
ensure or encourage diversity in any matchings, instead focusing only on how
qualified the members are to the task (standard weighted b-matching) and meet-
ing the cost/capacity constraint. However, in the offline case, Ahmed et al. [41]
provided an algorithm for diverse b-matching applied to reviewer-paper match-
ing of conference papers. Their matching occurred offline (where all people and
tasks were known ahead of time) using a Mixed Integer Quadratic Program,
rather than the real-time case that more realistically captures actual team for-
mation in most firms or communities. They also proposed a pseudo-polynomial
time algorithm, which guarantees to provide optimal solution for the offline
matching problem using an auxiliary graph approach [42]. In [43], authors study
the offline diverse team formation problem and provide a polynomial method
for approximating optimal team formation. They study a complementary def-
inition of diversity, where the goal is to find teams that are close to a given
distribution and not the team members being different from each other.
2.3 Why form teams in real-time?
In contrast to offline team formation, real-time algorithms (also called online
algorithms) are more appropriate for forming teams for tasks where a timeline
exists with varying worker arrivals and departures. This paper contributes a
means to form teams that are both diverse and formed in real-time. In real-
time team assignment problems: (1) a firm has a fixed set of tasks/teams and a
budget that specifies how many times the firm would like each task completed
or how many teams it needs; (2) new people arrive at the firm one at a time (in
the case of regular hiring) and potentially the same person could arrive multiple
times (e.g., in the case of freelancing or gig/shift work); and (3) people must be
assigned to a team immediately upon arrival (or rejected and not assigned to
any team). The goal is to allocate people to teams in a way that maximizes the
value of collaborative work all teams produce (i.e., solely maximizing utility).
But why do we need to form teams in real-time? Doesn’t one still need
the team to be built to start performing its task? In such a case, the team
members who arrive earlier need to wait for later team members to join the
team. If they are waiting for other workers to join, why can they not just wait
in a pool so that one can use an offline team formation algorithm? The answer
to these questions relate to two main factors: (a) the type of the task, and
(b) the compensation of the individuals. First, not all team tasks require the
entire team to work synchronously. In tasks like conference paper reviewing,
each team member works independently and then their output is aggregated.
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Real-time team formation works well for such tasks. However, even in tasks
which require the team to work synchronously, real-time team formation can
help when task timeliness and cost are constrained. To form the teams offline,
one may have to create a large pool of workers and ask them all to wait until
the pool is large enough. This means all the workers have to be paid while
waiting and many may drop-out from the waiting room. In contrast, a real-
time algorithm only requires that the selected workers wait, not the entire pool.
This improvement in time comes at the cost of lower objective value, as offline
matching will always be strictly better than the real-time matching method
(assuming no drop-outs and ignoring the cost of waiting). Finally, in case of a
batch of workers appearing at a time, our algorithm can be easily modified to
use a submodular greedy method to rank order the entire batch and then use
real-time matching algorithm outlined in Algorithm 1.
Few papers have studied the real-time or online task assignment problem.
For instance, Roy et al. [44] proposed a framework for optimizing task assign-
ment in knowledge-intensive crowdsourcing. They maximize overall task quality
and minimize cost, with constraints on skill, cost, and tasks per worker. Unlike
our work, they use an additive skill aggregation model [40] to calculate the to-
tal skill of a team of workers. The work closest in scope to our problem that
of Schmitz et al. [45] who study the problem of both task assignment (finding
which worker should do which task) and sequencing (identifying at what time
each worker should contribute). Their model assumes that workers are available
only at specific time slots and worker/task arrivals are not known apriori. In
their work, the utility provided by each worker in a team or task is independent
of other workers. This assumption can fail if previously arrived workers have
similar skills and have already joined the team. In contrast to their method, we
address a harder problem where every worker’s utility depends on whoever else
has already been accepted to the team.
This paper addresses how to maximize both utility and diversity—where
we, similarly to past research, represent diversity using a submodular function.
Mathematically, we essentially express the diverse real-time matching problem
as a subset selection problem with multiple knapsack constraints. Online match-
ing and its generalization to set packing have been studied through the lens of
theoretical computer science for nearly three decades [46]. These algorithms
have been applied to a multitude of tasks like online video summarization [47].
The algorithms we present in this paper draw motivation most heavily from
recent work in online stochastic optimization with nonlinear objectives [48, 49],
and from [50] in particular.
3 Diversity in Matching
This section introduces some of the more detailed mathematical notation needed
to properly describe our algorithm for team formation in the next section. We
flesh out in more precise detail how diversity is modeled and calculated via a
submodular function and how this relates to matching people to teams.
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We model the overall problem as maximizing a monotone submodular func-
tion over b-matchings in a bipartite graph G = (P, T, E), where P is a set of
M vertices (e.g., people) that arrive sequentially, T is a set of N vertices (e.g.,
teams) known a priori, and where no vertex i (team or people) is incident to
more than b(i) edges in a proposed matching (i.e., we cannot assign a person
i to more than b(i) teams at once), and E is the set of edges between teams
and people. Even the offline version of this problem is NP-Hard,so we focus on
approximate submodular maximization and instead bound how close we can get
to the optimal solution. To incorporate diversity, we consider a scenario where
left-side nodes (e.g., the people) are divided into K groups or clusters (as shown
in Fig. 1). We want a matching which allocates each node on the right side (a
team) to nodes from different clusters on the left side (people). A set of edges is
considered diverse if it connects left side nodes (people) from different clusters.
For example, in Fig. 1, matching team t1 to person p1 and p2 is a non-diverse
matching (as both p1 and p2 come from same color block), while matching it
to p1 and p3 is considered diverse. Note that the clustering can be pre-defined
(like the country of origin of workers) or calculated using any attribute. The
methods discussed here are agnostic to the choice of clustering method, and they
assume that each item has a cluster label and we want to maximize coverage
over different cluster labels. If the labels are country of origin of workers, then
the optimal teams will have people from different countries.
We use a square-root-based diversity reward function which balances the
number of nodes (e.g., people) selected from different clusters, adapted from the
work of [31] on multi-document summarization. We first define some notations.
Sj ⊆ E is the subset of edges in a proposed matching that are also incident to
team j ∈ T . Assuming people belong to K clusters—e.g., of skillsets or levels
of experience—Pk ⊆ P , k ∈ [K] is a partition of all people P (i.e., ∪kPk = P
and Pk ∩Pk′ = ∅ for all k 6= k′). This means that each edge is associated with
the cluster of the person it is incident on. We also define wi,j as the quality (or
expertise) of worker i to do team j. In our context, for a specific team j ∈ T ,
we define an objective function fj : E → R which rewards diversity as follows:
f(Sj) =
K∑
k=1
√ ∑
{i | i∈Pk ∧ (i,j)∈Sj}
wi,j (1)
The part within the square root function controls the quality such that a
higher weight wi,j implies the person i offers higher utility (better expertise or
higher quality) for the job j. On the other hand, the sum of the square roots
corresponding to each cluster means that adding nodes from the same cluster
gives less marginal gain compared to adding nodes from a different cluster.
Hence, it promotes diversity by preferring people from groups that have not
been well represented in the teams so far.
Maximizing
∑
j∈T f(Sj) over all legal matchings S allows us to solve the
offline diverse matching problem. To solve the offline problem, submodular
function maximization techniques [51] can be used; however, this assumes that
we know exactly all of the people who will be available now and in the future.
Note that we chose the objective function in Eq. 1 because it is submodular, it
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can be optimized using a mixed integer convex solver and has been shown to
give a state-of-art performance in diversity measurement for document summa-
rization tasks [32]. However, there are other submodular functions too, which
are used in literature to measure diversity (like Herfindahl Index [52]), and they
can be used instead of Eq. 1. The team formation algorithm, which we discuss
later, can be integrated with any monotonic submodular function, for which we
can estimate the optimal solution.
In the next section, we define the real-time variant of this problem where
we do not assume to know exactly which people will arrive in the future and
perform matching “on-the-fly,” which more accurately mirrors real-world team
formation.
4 Team Formation with Sequentially Arriving
People
In our real-time model for team formation/assignment, we again model people
and teams with a bipartite graph G(P, T,E) where an edge e = (i, j) ∈ E
represents whether a person i ∈ P can perform task or join a team j ∈ T .
Teams are represented as the right side of the bipartite graph and people are
considered on the left side. There is a firm with a limited budget of B and a
set of N heterogeneous teams T that need to form. People arrive one at a time
from a large pool P . Each person i ∈ P has a fixed cost cSi which is the cost
of interviewing or screening the person, during which we learn their attributes
(e.g., demographic information, skillset, etc.). After the interview/screener, the
firm must either assign the person to one or more teams or reject the person.
When a person is accepted for team j, she receives a payment/salary/bonus of
cBi,j . Note that while we mentioned using b(i) to refer to the upper bound for
any node i, to differentiate between the upper capacity of teams and people on
the two sides of a graph, we use notations R+ and L+ also. Each team has an
upper budget R+ of the maximum number of workers it needs. Each person
has an upper budget L+ of the maximum number of teams she is willing to
simultaneously participate in. Every time a person is interviewed/screened, the
set of edges from the person to all teams is considered to “arrive.”
Each person i has a weight wi,j representing the local utility (i.e., fit, value,
etc.) derived by the firm after matching her to j (we assume that after team
formation, the person performs the task). We use M to denote the maximum
number of people who can arrive, which is assumed to be known by the firm;
typically, M is determined by the firm’s budget and screening cost cSi .
With this setup, our problem can now be formulated as a real-time submod-
ular maximization problem with N knapsack constraints—the N teams’ upper
bounds R+.
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4.1 Overview of our streaming algorithm
To perform real-time team formation, we treat people as a continuous stream,
and build upon past approaches to streaming algorithms to do diverse match-
ing. Specifically, our objective function is monotonic submodular with an upper
bound on the cardinality of people and teams. Recently proposed algorithms by
[50] attempts to solve the problem of real-time submodular maximization with
d knapsack constraints, for d ∈ N (fully described as Algorithm 4 of [53]). This
algorithm estimates optima for the offline problem based on all items and then
accepts or rejects edges based on feasibility and marginal gain being above a
cut-off value. An optimum is estimated either using maximum possible marginal
gain over all edges, or the current maximum marginal gain.
Algorithm by Yu et al. [53] cannot be practically applied to the team forma-
tion problem due to two reasons. First, it maintains multiple separate assign-
ment solutions and, when items arrive, they are accepted or rejected for each
list separately. An arriving item can be accepted by multiple lists and rejected
by others. Practically, this would mean that when a person arrives at a firm,
he or she is possibly allocated to several teams and rejected by others. The
person does their allocated job for all the teams they are accepted for and the
firm maintains multiple possible allocations simultaneously. After completing
the real-time allocation phase (when all people have arrived), the firm would
then “select” the allocation list that has with maximum utility. This would
mean that many people previously allocated to (and already working on) teams
would then be rejected. If a person has completed the task already, then their
output gets wasted. Each person may have to be paid for all the tasks they did,
while only a fraction of tasks is used.
Second, their algorithm has only capacity constraints, implying that in many
situations, teams may receive fewer people than its upper bounds (due to strict
filtering). This can be problematic in practical scenarios, where teams often
require at least a minimum number of people and have upper bounds too—i.e.,
have both coverage and knapsack constraints.
In this paper, we address these two issues with modifications to algorithm
of [53], for practical team formation. We propose to use Algorithm 1 for submod-
ular maximization with d-knapsack constraints, where optima objective value
(OPT ) is known. In this algorithm, ce,jj is the cost of admitting an edge e (cor-
responding to worker being allocated to team) for the d constraints. For our
case, with only maximum team size as capacity constraints, ce,jj is 1 and the
maximum capacity of a team equals b = R+. Running this algorithm requires
an α-approximation of the global optimum for the offline case, α ∈ (0, 1]. v is a
value less than OPT and greater than αOPT , and we later explain how v can
be estimated. ∆ f(∅, e) is the marginal gain of adding a single edge e to a null
set. ∆ f(S, e) is the marginal gain of adding edge e to the set S. This algorithm
provides a α1+2d -approximation guarantee of the optimal solution, where d is
the number of knapsacks and α is the approximation factor up to which we can
estimate the optima OPT .
We solve the problem of real-time team formation in three steps using Algo-
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Algorithm 1: Real-time Diverse Matching
Input: v such that αOPT ≤ v ≤ OPT , α ∈ (0, 1]
Output: A feasible team allocation S ⊆ E
1 S ← ∅
2 for i← 1 to M do
3 Find a permutation φ of all edges from i s.t.
∆f(S, φ1) ≥ ∆f(S, φ2) ≥ ... ≥ ∆f(S, φN )
4 for e← φ1 to φN do
5 if ce,jj ≥ b2 and ∆f(∅,e)ce,jj ≥ 2vb(1+2d) , for any jj ∈ [d] then
6 S = {e}; return S
7 if
∑
l∈S∪e cl,jj ≤ b and ∆f(S,e)ce,jj ≥ 2vb(1+2d) , ∀jj ∈ [d] then
8 S = S ∪ {e}
9 return S
rithm 1. First, we define a convex optimization problem and solve it to estimate
an upper bound on OPT . Second, instead of individual edges (items) arriving
sequentially, we receive a batch of edges (corresponding to all teams a person
could join) arriving together. We sort these edges for marginal utility provided
by an edge and send them in decreasing order of marginal gain provided by
them. By prioritizing tasks more suited to the skill set of a person, we im-
prove the performance of our algorithm by giving strictly better results than
random order. Third, we discuss setting α using marginal gains for clusters
to guarantee that we can satisfy lower bounds too (given unlimited arrival of
people). Note that in Algorithm 1, we have not explicitly mentioned the case
with capacity constraints on people (when each worker cannot do more than
L+ jobs) or monetary budget constraints (when maximum budget B is given
for team formation), but adding these constraints is straightforward and does
not change the algorithm. To add any additional constraints like budget or per-
son capacity, we only need to define the individual cost incurred in selecting the
corresponding node and the total budget allowed. For instance, considering the
monetary case would mean cost cl,jj in Algorithm 1 equals c
B
i,j for the budget
constraints and upper bound b equals B. We do not model the screening cost
cSi in accepting or rejecting a worker.
We provide a summary of the algorithm’s intuition before diving into details
on how to estimate parameters in it. Algorithm 1 decides the allocation for
each edge (from a person to a task) independently. This means when a person
arrives, it can do both — allocate the person to a new team or allocate the
person to a team with existing qualified workers. Let us consider a simple
case of three teams (T1, T2 and T3), maximum three team members in each
team, and 15 people from three countries (A, B and C). Each person can be a
part of maximum two teams. For simplicity of demonstration, we assume that
everyone from all countries are equally good (unit weight). The optimal offline
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diverse solution should have three people from different countries allocated to
each team.
Now, let us assume that people arrive in this order: A1, A2, C1, B1, B2, B3,
C2, C3, C4, A3, A4, A5, B4, B5, C5. When a person arrives, we first calculate
how much marginal gain they provide to each team and decide the allocation
of the team in descending order of marginal gain (Step 3 of Algorithm 1). The
allocation will work as follows2: A1 gets T1 (1) and T2 (1); A2 gets T3 (1);
C1 gets T1 (1) and T2 (1); B1 gets T3 (1) and T1 (1); B2 gets T2 (1); B3
gets rejected by all tasks (
√
2 − 1) and finally C2 gets T3 (1). As all teams
have received the required number of people, the rest are not needed. In this
example, we assumed that we knew the offline optimal solution. In next section,
we will explain how we can either estimate the optimal solution or circumvent
the need of estimating the optimal solution by using the marginal gain values.
4.2 Estimating the Optimum: Finding the maximum num-
ber of people from each cluster
To estimate the optimum for the offline problem, we assume an unlimited stream
of people exists, without knowing the number of people arriving from each
cluster or their order. We make two assumptions. First, we assume that all
people from the same cluster provide similar utility for any given team and,
second, we assume that people are willing to participate in all teams. With
these assumptions, we can formulate the diversity maximization problem for all
teams by summing up submodular gains across each team and each cluster from
Eq. 1. Let yk,j be the number of people from cluster k matched to team j. Let
wk,j be utility of a worker from cluster k matched to team j. The maximum
number of people who can work in a given team is R+. Hence we define the
following problem:
max
y
N∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
√
wk,jyk,j s.t.
K∑
k=1
yk,j ≤ R+j ∀j ∈ [N ] (2)
This is a concave maximization problem with linear constraints, and can
be solved using a convex solver for real-valued y and optimum value OPT ∗.
A mixed-integer convex solver can also be used to obtain the true OPT [54];
however, such solvers are still in their nascency and, as we discuss later, the
real-valued relaxation is sufficient for our case.
Solving Eq. 2 with real valued y yields OPT ∗, which satisfies αOPT ≤
v ≤ OPT ≤ OPT ∗. Solving this problem essentially estimates how many
people from each cluster we should expect in an optimal solution and not the
allocation of individual people (as people are exchangeable within a cluster).
We use OPT ∗ in place of OPT to filter edges in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 accepts or rejects edges based on marginal gain and constraint
satisfaction in Step 5. However, in practice, matching people to teams often also
requires a lower bound of at least R− people for each team. In Algorithm 1, it is
2The marginal gain of each person for their allocated task is shown in round brackets.
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possible that the cut-off is too high for marginal gain (Step 5) and enough people
do not get assigned to each team. To solve this problem, we pre-calculate the
marginal gains for each cluster and find the R−th highest marginal gain among
all clusters (denoted as dfR−). This value is used to set the value of v (used in
Algorithm 1) such that:
v ≤ dfR− .b.(1 + 2d)
2
(3)
Setting v using Eq. 3 ensures that at least R− workers will get accepted by
the algorithm irrespective of the arrival order of people as the marginal gain of
(R−)th person will still be below the cut-off in Step 5 of the algorithm. In the
simulation results, we explain how setting α or v not only helps ensure the lower
bounds but also improves overall matching utility. If the optimization problem
in Eq. 2 is solved exactly with integral y, the current algorithm also provides a
α
1+2d approximation of the optimal solution. The specific choice of v or order of
arrival of nodes does not alter the theoretical guarantees. For clarity, we have
provided a table with nomenclatures in the supplementary material [Insert link
to Supplemental Material here.].
4.3 Performance metrics for diverse allocation
We measure the performance of diverse matching on two factors—how much
cluster diversity it adds to the team and how much utility it loses for the re-
quester relative to maximum-weighted matching. To measure improvement in
diversity, we measure the Shannon entropy of a match for each team, with and
without our method. Shannon entropy has been used to incorporate diversity in
recommendations and matching [55, 41] and is also widely used in the ecological
literature as a diversity index. It quantifies the uncertainty in predicting the
cluster label of an individual that is taken at random from the dataset. Entropy
of a team is given by: −∑Ki=1 (pk log pk), where pk is the proportion of people
on that team from cluster k. Hence, the impact of real-time diverse matching
can be measured as improvement in average entropy for all teams. We define
the entropy gain (EG) as:
EG =
Average entropy using a diverse matching rule
Average entropy using baseline allocation
(4)
Entropy for a team is maximized if it has members with even coverage of
different clusters; entropy is minimized when all people are from the same clus-
ter.
To measure the loss of utility due to diverse matching, we adopt the price
of diversity metric proposed by [41] which measures the trade-off in economic
efficiency under a diverse matching objective. Specifically, we define two com-
plementary versions of this metric. First, to measure the economic loss due to
rejection of people by diverse matching, we define the price of diversity (PoD#)
as:
PoD# =
Number of people interviewed for diverse allocation
Number of people interviewed for baseline allocation
. (5)
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For example, let us say a team requires four people and diverse matching
rejects two people and finds an allocation after the arrival of the sixth person. If
a baseline method accepts the first four people, PoD# will be 1.5, implying that
encouraging diversity requires interviewing/screening 1.5 times as many people.
Normally, the cost of interviewing or screening candidates is low compared to
the cost of the main team (e.g., paying their salary); thus, even large values of
PoD# may be acceptable, and will also depend on resultant entropy gain.
We also define utility-based price of diversity, PoDu, to measure the aggre-
gate weight lost due to rejecting people by diverse matching as:
PoDu =
Utility obtained using baseline allocation
Utility obtained using diverse allocation
. (6)
For example, say a team j requires three people, and that people belong
to one of three clusters k ∈ {1, 2, 3} with team utilities w{1,2,3},j = {3, 1, 1},
respectively. If we use a greedy algorithm as a baseline, it will maximize utility
only by selecting people from the first cluster, accruing total utility of 9, while
diverse matching will accrue total utility of 5 by selecting one people from each
group. Hence, PoDu will be 1.8 against the greedy baseline.
5 Experimental Results
We begin this section by testing our algorithm on simulated results, showing
how the price of diversity is affected by factors like how many people come from
each cluster. Next, we deploy it on an online platform to show how filtering
works in practice. We use our online platform to collect data from 50 online
crowd workers, who are tasked to complete two tasks. Using this data, we then
show our algorithm’s performance on the true arrival order as well as the new
unseen arrival ordering of workers. While we compare our algorithm’s final
utility with the offline performance, we cannot use it as a baseline to calculate
PoD#, as it requires all people to be present in a pool. Instead, we use the
first-come-first-serve (random) allocation baseline for our experiments. For the
baseline, people who satisfy all the constraints are allocated to tasks without
optimizing for diversity. Lastly, we create another simulated dataset and show
how the matching algorithm can be used to handle complex constraints and
diversity for multiple attributes.
5.1 Team formation for simulated agents
In this section, we test our algorithm on simulated data. We consider simulated
people sampled from different groups arriving in real-time and the algorithm as-
signs them to different teams. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method
in different situations when there are balanced or imbalanced clusters (or group
identities), when the utilities of workers are different and when the arrival or-
dering of the workers varies.
For our study, we consider 10 team tasks (N = 10), each of which requires
at most 3 people (R+ = b = 3). People are sampled from 3 clusters (K = 3).
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In the real world, these clusters can be any label attached to a person, like the
country of origin, race or area of expertise. While the total number of groups
is known beforehand, a person’s group or cluster id is known only after she
arrives (i.e., are interviewed/screened). The cluster ID refers to any possible
grouping of people. Clusters can be based on single attributes (like gender or
country) or a combination of attributes. Our model assumes that the utility
obtained from all people sampled from the same group is the same. We start
by simulating a situation where every person’s utility is the same irrespective of
what cluster they belong to, and all the clusters are roughly the same size. Next,
we show what happens when people from particular clusters have higher or lower
utility. We demonstrate how the parameter α affects matching performance in
such cases. Finally, we show that our algorithm is robust, even for skewed
distributions.
Clusters with equal utility
Imagine a case, where a firm tries to recruit people who belong to three different
professions. Each profession is valued equally to complete the task and roughly
one-third of the applicants belong to each profession. To model such a scenario,
we consider three equally probable clusters offering equal utility, where all people
have unit utility for all tasks, hence w{1,2,3},j = {1, 1, 1}. We do not model the
monetary cost of interviewing or total budget, so ci,j = 1 for all workers and
teams. We do 100 runs with a maximum of 100 people (M = 100) streaming
in random order. People are drawn from a multinomial distribution with cluster
probabilities θ = [ 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ], respectively.
Solving the optimization problem in Eq. 2, we find the offline optimal ob-
jective value OPT ∗ = 30.0. For our simulation, we set α = 1 (which
gives v = 30.0). This gives the worst-case performance bound of 1.428 for
the real-time algorithm. Using Algorithm 1 to filter edges, we obtained the
team assignment for all the runs. In each run, we were able to find the op-
timal matching with utility 30.0, which is also the offline optimal allocation
(one person accepted from each cluster). Entropy for all teams in all 100 runs
is 1.09, implying that all teams were formed with people from three different
clusters. In our experiment, we find that, on average over the different runs,
the median number of people we interviewed before forming a diverse team is
5 people. For the run with the worst-case performance of our algorithm, we
interviewed 8 people and the run requiring minimum interviews had only 3 in-
terviews to hire 3 people. Hence, median PoD# is 2.67, while PoDu is 1. This
means that diverse matching improves coverage over clusters in all cases, but
requires us to interview or screen 2.67 times as many people before we can form
diverse and high-quality teams. To facilitate reproducibility, we have provided
a table with nomenclatures and the values used in the above experiment in the
supplementary material.
14
Avoiding Task Starvation
In our optimization problem, we do not explicitly impose lower bounds (cover
constraints) on teams or tasks, i.e. we do not model a constraint saying each
team must get a minimum threshold number of people. However, for real-time
team formation, teams may require at least R− people to be effective. As
discussed earlier, Eq. 3 can be used to set α, guaranteeing the goal of meeting
the minimum quota. Using Eq. 3, v ≤ 31.5 for the previous case requiring 3
workers for each task (R− = 3), so setting α = 1 satisfied this condition.
The parameter α acts as a filter, as decreasing it lets the real-time algorithm
accept more people from each cluster (forming less diverse teams for the sake of
expediency) while increasing it accepts only the workers with highest marginal
gain (holding out on candidates until it can form a diverse team). On one hand,
setting α too high will mean most people get rejected, leading to a matching
where a team never receives enough people. However, reducing α to very low
values will essentially accept all people and behave similarly to random team
formation (i.e., just allocate whichever person arrives first). For example, in the
previous problem, when we reduce α to 0.4, the median fitness drops to 24.14,
while the median entropy drops to 0.636. This means that the median team
has three workers, who belong to only two clusters. Hence, by smartly choosing
the parameters of the algorithm, we can control how strict we want to be in the
filtering of incoming workers.
Clusters with different utility
Imagine a case, where a firm tries to recruit people who belong to three different
professions. Each profession is valued differently with people from one profession
being more desirable as another. Unequal weights can be allocated to people
when those from a particular profession specialize in the task. Roughly one-
third of the applicants belong to each profession. To model such a scenario,
we consider clusters with unequal cluster utility. In this work, we assume that
we know the team task utility for each group after the screening task and that
other methods like expertise identification can be used to identify how much a
person is valuable to the team task at hand. In this simulation, we consider
three clusters with utilities w{1,2,3},j = {3, 2, 1}.
On running the simulation, we found that setting α = 1 and simulating
100 runs led to a median fitness of 31.4 with all team tasks only matched to
two people (one from cluster 0 and other from cluster 1). From Fig. 2b, we
notice that the marginal gain of the first person from Cluster 2 is 1.0 (y value
on the green curve corresponding to x=1). The red horizontal line for α = 1
has a y-intercept greater than 1.0, hence this person will not be accepted by
the algorithm. The optimal fitness OPT ∗ from Eq. 2 is 42.42. However, if α is
reduced to 0.7 (which is less than the cut-off of 0.74 calculated using Eq. 3), the
desirable lower bound is met (each team receives three people) and the median
fitness for 100 runs improves to 41.46 (which is also the optimum fitness for the
offline problem). Hence, the real-time matching algorithm gives the optimum
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(a) Effect of α on worker accep-
tance from each cluster.
(b) Effect of α on utility and en-
tropy. Utility maximizes when α
is set according to Eq. 3
Figure 2: Effect of α on worker acceptance and mean utility
offline allocation of diverse teams.
In this case, the median entropy is 1.09 with zero violations—i.e., all teams
get three people from three different clusters. On average, the team forms after
5 workers arrive. In the worst case, the team formed after 16 workers arrived,
leading to a median PoD# of 1.67. Fig. 2b shows how utility increases when
lowering α initially, and then decreases on further reducing it. This is due
to the submodular marginal gain of individual clusters as shown in Fig. 2a.
The x-axis shows the number of people selected from a single cluster for a
single task. Here, each new person from a cluster provides less marginal utility
and different clusters have different curves for marginal gain. In Step 5 of
Algorithm 1, we accept or reject people if their marginal gain exceeds a cut-off
directly proportional to α (as shown by the dotted red lines). We will accept
people from a given cluster until the marginal gain curve for that cluster dips
below the dotted line. The marginal gain of people belonging to each cluster is
shown, where the first person from Cluster 0 has a marginal gain of 1.73 and the
second person from Cluster 0 has a marginal gain of 0.72. Hence if α = 1, only
a maximum of one item from Cluster 0 will be accepted. Similarly for Cluster
1, if α = 0.5, a maximum of two people can be accepted.
Similarly, for α = 0.3, up to 5 people from cluster 0, 3 people from cluster
1 and 2 people from cluster 2 can be accepted. Although, the actual accep-
tance rate depends on the order in which people arrive, setting α less than
0.74 guarantees that real-time diverse matching has zero violations as soon as
one person from each cluster shows up. The theoretical lower bound on to-
tal utility, in this case, is ≤ 1.46 and in practice, we get much better results.
For the tasks requiring three workers, we first find the third-highest marginal
gain among all clusters. As shown in Fig. 2a, there are three clusters with
weights 3 (blue), 2 (orange) and 1 (green). The top four marginal gain values
are
√
3,
√
2, 1and
√
6−√3. For R− = 3, the third-highest value is dfR− = 1.
After obtaining dfR− , we calculate v using Eq. 2.
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Figure 3: Effect of Cluster Distribution. Left: Expected number of people
needed . Right: Actual number of people needed (median of 100 runs).
Different sized clusters
Imagine a case where a firm tries to recruit people who belong to three different
countries. We assume that workers from different countries have different utility
for different tasks and the number of workers from each country is different. Such
a situation frequently occurs on Amazon Turk, when a person wants to assemble
a team of people belonging to different countries from an online community
or a pool of people (such as Mechanical Turk). If we consider three clusters
being the US, India and all of the other countries, then past literature [56,
57] has shown that approximately 75% workers belong are from the US and
16% from India. This means that if we draw randomly from the population,
it is equivalent to sampling from a multinomial distribution with proportions
θ = [0.75, 0.16, 0.09]. Let us assume that the utility of assigning a person from
these clusters to a team is w{1,2,3},j = {1, 2, 3}, respectively, implying a worker
from India is twice more suitable for this task than a worker from the US. If a
firm knows these proportions, a natural and practical question to ask is, “How
much budget will I need to form a diverse team?” or “How many people should
I expect to reject to form a diverse team?”
To answer this, we use the following example. A firm can only pay to
interview at most 10 people. When the firm starts interviewing, assume that
[6, 3, 1] people arrive from three clusters, respectively. As people are drawn
from a multinomial distribution, we can calculate the probability of this event
as: Pr(6, 3, 1) = 10!6!3!1! (0.75)
6(0.16)3(0.1)0.09 = 0.055. We also know the
maximum number of people allowed from each cluster (e.g., one person), which
means 7 people will be rejected in expectation. Likewise, we enumerate all
possible scenarios for different numbers of people coming from each group and
calculate the expected number of people accepted for that distribution. In this
case, we expect to accept 2.95 people. This makes sense, as we need 3 out of 10
people to complete the task and in some cases, people may arrive only from one
or two clusters. As we increase the number of people we interview, the expected
number of accepted people also increases. Hence, we can calculate the expected
number of people we need to screen to get 3 people accepted for each team.
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Figure 3 shows the expected number of people needed to get the desired
three people (zero violations) for different cluster probability distributions. The
x-axis shows cluster 0’s probability while the y-axis shows cluster 1’s probability.
Even for very skewed distributions with θ = [0.9, 0.05, 0.05], we get a PoD#
of only 15.4. In plain words, this means that if 90% of the worker population
is from the US and only 5% worker population is from India, and a firm wants
to create a diverse team, it should expect to interview approximately 15 people
for every one person accepted for the team. This is attributed to the skewed
distribution, where people from certain clusters rarely show up.
In general, Fig. 3 is trying to demonstrate what happens when the num-
ber of people arriving from three different clusters is highly skewed–that this,
how are my interviewing costs affected by diversity requirements, if there are
(comparatively) few applicants in a given category? Each point on Fig. 3 is a
distribution of people. The x-axis and y-axis show the proportion of people from
the first two clusters. Let us say, we are trying to hire a team of three people,
with people coming from three different countries (C1, C2, and C3). Now, we
take a point on Fig. 3, say x = 0.4, y = 0.3. This means 40% of all the people
are from C1 (e.g. USA), 30% of all the people are from C2 (e.g. India) and
remaining people are from C3 (e.g. 30% are from all the other countries). The
dark blue color at x = 0.4, y = 0.3 maps to a value of 5 people (as shown in the
legend). As people from C1, C2 and C3 are in large proportions, on average,
one only needs to interview five people to form a diverse team of three people.
Hence, Fig. 4b shows how many people we have to reject before accepting a
person for different proportions of populations.
In context, if people are paid $1.00 to interview them compared to $100.00 for
doing the main task, then for zero expected violations (i.e., forming all teams)
it costs only $46.20 more compared to no screening and accepting the first three
people—even under a highly skewed distribution of clusters with people from
each of the two groups representing only 5% of the population. In the median
case, where distributions are more even, it only costs an extra $5.00 to get a
diverse allocation. Fig. 3 shows the results on simulating 100 runs for different
probabilities of clusters and observing the median number of people needed by
our algorithm.
Table 1: Distribution of various personal attributes in our MTurk experiment
Age
ID Age
Gender
ID Gender
Education
ID Education
Country
ID Country
Politics
ID Politics
Race
ID Race
0 18-24 (20%) 0 Male (54%) 0
High school degree
or equivalent (2%) 0 US (72%) 0 Democrat (46%) 0 White (56%)
1 25-34 (48%) 1 Female (46%) 1
Some college credit,
No degree (12%) 1 India (28%) 1 Republican (30%) 1 Asian (30%)
2 35-44(14%) 2 Associates degree (12%) 2 2 Independent (20%) 2 Hispanic (2%)
3 45-54 (8%) 3 Bachelors degree (50%) 3 Other (4%) 3
American Indian or
Alaska Native (6%)
4 55-64 (10%) 4 Masters degree (22%) 4 Other (6%)
5 Doctorate degree (2%)
For clusters with different probabilities, we simulate 10 teams and 100 people,
fix α = 0.7, and calculate the utility and entropy for 100 different runs, drawing
samples randomly according to the cluster 0 and cluster 1 probabilities. Each
run randomizes the order in which people arrive. Our simulation shows that even
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Table 2: MTurk Price of Diversity (PoD#) and Entropy Gain in three cases:
1) Realized order (Column 2 and 3), 2) Median case (Column 4 and 5), and
3) Worst-case order (Column 6). We also report the additional expenditure of
interviewing people for three positions in the realized order, when each interview
costs $0.10.
Cluster Entropy Gain PoD# Additional Expenditure Median Entropy Gain Median PoD# Worst-case PoD#
Age 1.34 3.75 $1.12 1.23 1.25 7.25
Gender 1.0 1.0 $0.30 1.33 2 10.5
Education 1.33 2.0 $0.60 1.33 2.25 9.5
Country 1.0 1.0 $0.30 1.23 1.5 9.5
Politics 1.33 4.25 $1.27 2.0 3.75 12.25
Race 2.0 10.75 $3.22 2.0 3 11.25
for skewed distributions, our algorithm successfully finds high utility solutions.
In all cases where people from all three clusters show up, real-time diverse
matching finds solutions as good as the offline optimal solution. For edge cases,
where not a single person from cluster 1, 2 or 3 shows up, the competitive
ratio (performance compared to the offline algorithm) is 0.81, 0.79 and 0.80
respectively. In these edge cases, the team minimum requirement of workers
(or lower bounds) is not satisfied by real-time matching as it only assigns two
people per team rather than three. No one from the third cluster shows up and
the algorithm does not accept multiple people from clusters which do show up
to avoid a non-diverse allocation. However, out of the 171, 00 total orderings we
simulated, only 40 such violations occurred (i.e., teams did not get three people
as nobody from one cluster ever arrived in only 0.23% cases).
We find that the median number of people needed for balanced distributions
is low (5 people for θ = [0.33, 0.33, 0.34]). For skewed distributions, where
people from one or more clusters rarely occur, the median number of people
needed to be interviewed is more (27 people for θ = [0.05, 0.05, 0.9]). The
values are similar to the expected number of people shown in the left side of
Fig. 3, where we calculate the expectation values instead of simulating them.
Worst-Case Ordering
So far, we have assumed that workers arrive randomly from a known or unknown
distribution. However, imagine the worst case scenario, where workers come one
at a time, in such an order that the cost of interviewing workers by the algorithm
is maximized. Suppose a firm is willing to interview 20 workers (some of whom
they will hire), but it does not know how many people will come from each
group. Assuming that the clusters have highly skewed utilities of [1, 30, 30], that
is workers from the second and third cluster provide 30 times utility compared
to the utility of workers from the first cluster. The optimal worker allocation is
[0, 1, 2] people from first, second and third cluster respectively, with 13.2 utility
(OPT ∗ = 13.52). We set α = 0.75 for zero violations, which means that
the algorithm only accepts people from the last two clusters due to the skewed
weights. However, the worst case ordering could have 20 workers from the lowest
weight cluster (cluster 0 in this case) all apply first. In such a case, the diverse
matching strategy will not accept any of the first 20 applicants. Hence, with
a limited number of applicants, the algorithm can do arbitrarily bad if people
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from a few clusters never show up. In contrast, if an unlimited stream of workers
is allowed, we are guaranteed to have no violations and will achieve a utility of
13.2 when people from the second and third cluster eventually arrive. In the
next section, we show that the price of diversity is not high in practice, even
when workers arrive in the worst case ordering.
5.2 Team formation for crowd workers arriving sequen-
tially
Using the simulation studies, we showed the efficacy of our real-time matching
algorithm under different worker utilities and different probability distributions
of classes. To further understand how the method performs when applied to
a web platform to recruit workers, we conducted a crowdsourcing experiment.
To test our algorithm for an online crowd team, we implemented diverse worker
allocation on MTurk via two stages. We created a web platform, where we
posted a screening task where people provided us demographic information.
Next, we asked them to complete an ideation task in the second stage. To make
the experimental protocol easier and simpler to test and replicate, we selected
writing tasks that were easy to complete in a short amount of time by team
members and did not require the expertise of the workers in an Engineering
domain. However, the methods developed in this work to filter workers are
task-agnostic and can be applied equally well to relevant engineering tasks such
as forming diverse technical teams or assigning design review tasks to diverse
experts.
For the sake of demonstration, we assumed that our task required teams
with education diversity, under the assumption that we wish to form teams
with different educational backgrounds. Online crowd workers reported their
educational background using six pre-specified categories ranging from “High
school degree or equivalent” to “Doctorate degree”. The categories and cor-
responding cluster id for various worker attributes are listed in Table 1. We
categorized education up to a high school degree (ID 0) as Cluster 0, other
non-graduate degrees (ID 1, 2, 3) as Cluster 1, and graduate degrees (ID 4,
5) as Cluster 2. In this task, we assumed that workers from Cluster 0 provide
thrice utility compared to workers from Cluster 2. This screening task filtered
people using pre-set weights of w = [3, 2, 1] for three clusters (K = 3) and
α = 0.7. It used two constraints d = 2 corresponding to maximum people
needed for each task. We designed a platform, which after receiving a per-
son’s screener response, either directs them to the last page or allocates them
to two different teams/tasks (N = 2). Each team/task required 3 people
(R+ = R− = b = 3), we paid 10 cents for the screening task (cSi = 0.10),
and a $1.00 bonus for the main task (cBi,j = 1.00). When we started the
experiment, we received people with education levels denoted by the following
labels (ID’s in Table 1): 3, 1, 3, 1, 1, 4, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 2, 3, 1, 3, 2, 0. The first entry
(3) shows that the first person indicated her educational level to be “Bache-
lor’s degree” (from Table 1), hence she belongs to Cluster 1, and so on for the
remaining entries.
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Upon running this experiment, we found that our algorithm accepted the
first, second and eighteenth person, providing a diverse mix of education. Al-
though the first three people could have provided a total utility of 6 (2+2+2),
they all belonged to the same cluster and offered no diversity of educational
level (zero entropy as first three people had a similar education level). Our
algorithm’s diverse allocation provided a utility of 7 (3 + 2 + 2). However, it
incurred a cost of $4.80 rather than the $3.00 it would have paid for non-diverse
allocation. PoD# in this case is 6 and PoDu is 0.86. The actual price of
diversity in different situations depends on the order in which people arrive.
To compare to counter-factual orderings, we ran another experiment where
each person completed both tasks every time they accepted a job (i.e., we did not
perform team formation immediately). This allowed us to measure each person’s
performance on all tasks. We then used this data to evaluate our algorithm by
using the same data set to evaluate and compare several orderings/assignments.
We provided people with two questions to each participant, who had to submit
their ideas on 1) “How might we make low-income urban areas safer and more
empowering for women and girls” 2) “How might we restore vibrancy in cities
and regions facing economic decline?”
These questions were selected as they are open-ended, complex and accepted
different viewpoints. They did not require previous domain knowledge by the
workers. We ran the experiment in three batches (M = 50 workers total).
For the screening task, we requested demographics from each person regarding
age, gender, education, country, political inclination 3, and race. In general,
we observed that the distribution of people in certain demographics was highly-
skewed (i.e., most people belonged to one class)—see Table 1.
Table 2 lists the real-time matching results for three scenarios. First (column
2 and 3), we calculated the Entropy Gain and PoD# for the actual order in
which we received people. We considered six cases, corresponding to the six
ways that individuals can be clustered (age, gender, education, country, politics
and race). The results showed that we can achieve much higher entropy gain
through diverse allocation compared to random allocation. For instance, the
Entropy Gain to achieve diverse allocation for Politics is 1.33, while the PoD#
is 4.25. This meant that we gain in diversity but have to interview 17 people
for every 4 people accepted in the team. Similarly, the PoD# for Age, Gender,
Education, Country and Race are 3.75, 1.0, 2.0, 1.0 and 10.75.
While the realized order shows an instance of the performance of our algo-
rithm, it is also possible that the next time we run it on an online platform,
then people show up in a different order. As the people we drew might not be
representative of other possible orders, we took 1000 permutations of those peo-
ple and calculated how our algorithm performs in each case. Next, we calculate
the median values for PoD# and entropy gain (column 4 and 5). We notice
that the real-time matching method successfully achieves large values for the
median gain in entropy too. Finally, we calculate the worst-case scenario, where
3While we used the terms “Democrat”, “Republican”, and “Independent” in our data
collection, this is similar to “Liberal,” “Conservative,” and “Moderate” terms, respectively,
used in other countries.
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the people belonging to the smallest cluster show up last. As expected, PoD#
is higher but is not unreasonable due to the low cost of the screening task.
5.3 Simultaneously Maximizing Diversity for Multiple At-
tributes
Figure 4: Bipartite illustration of the matching algorithm. People from different
countries are shown by different colored circles on the left. Females are shown by
larger circles compared to males. The number next to each person circle shows
the maximum number of teams that they are willing to join and the number
next to each team shows the maximum number of people needed in that team.
The bipartite graph on the right side shows first-come-first-serve matching and
the bipartite graph on the left side shows our diverse matching. We observe that
for this particular order, diverse matching interviews only three extra people but
leads to increase in gender entropy by 23% and increase in country entropy by
18%.
In many real-world applications, one may want to allocate people to teams,
such that teams are balanced for multiple factors like gender, skillset, experience,
etc. Our real-time diverse matching algorithm can also be used to form teams
by simultaneously maximizing diversity based on multiple attributes.
To demonstrate this, we experiment on a simulated example. Our goal of
this experiment is two-fold. First, we want to show how we can modify the
submodular objective function from Eq. 1 to measure diversity for multiple
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attributes (like gender and country of origin) simultaneously. Second, we also
show that the algorithm can be used when different teams and different people
have different demands. For example, one team may require three people, while
another may have a demand of five people. People may also have different
thresholds of the maximum number of teams they are willing to join. These
additional requirements make the problem more difficult to compute, especially
for a person trying to form teams manually.
We start by defining a new objective function to maximize diversity for two
attributes — gender and country of origin. Similar to Eq. 1, we define a new
objective function for a set Sj of people matched to task j. We use Kg to
represent the number of unique genders and Kc to represent the number of
unique countries. Pkg is the set of people who belong to gender kg (For e.g.,
males are mapped to kg = 0 and females are mapped to kg = 1). We define, Pkc
as the set of people who belong to country kc. The objective function f(Sj),
measuring the quality and multi-attribute diversity of a team j is defined as:
f(Sj) = r
Kc∑
kc=1
√√√√
∑
{i | i∈Pkc ∧ (i,j)∈Sj}
wi,j + (1− r)
Kg∑
kg=1
√√√√
∑
{i | i∈Pkg ∧ (i,j)∈Sj}
wi,j (7)
We use the weighing factor of r to define the relative importance of gender
and country diversity. Using Eq. 7 above, we can calculate the objective value
f(Sj) of any team. By taking the difference between the objective values before
and after adding a person to a team, we can calculate the marginal gain of that
person for that team. This marginal gain is used in Step 7 of Algorithm 1 to
decide whether a person gets allocated to that team or not. As f(Sj) is a sum
of two submodular functions, it is also submodular.
We create an experiment where there are 40 tasks and 50 workers. There
are 14 tasks that require three workers, 16 tasks which require four workers and
10 tasks which require five workers, as shown by values next to teams in Fig. 4.
There are 17 workers who will not accept more than 4 tasks, 18 workers who
will not accept more than 5 tasks and 15 workers who will not accept more than
6 tasks. Similarly, the maximum number of tasks a worker is willing to accept
is shown on the left of the worker nodes in Fig. 4. The figure has two bi-partite
graphs, each representing the same people and teams, but different matching
methods. The left sides of the first bipartite graphs show nodes representing
people and the right sides show teams. The number to the left of a person node
shows how many tasks a person is willing to accept. The number to the right
of a team node shows the maximum number of people that a team is willing to
hire.
We assume that people belong to one of five possible countries. The countries
C1 (red), C2 (blue), C3 (green), C4 (yellow) and C5 (cyan) have 20 workers,
10 workers, 10 workers, 5 workers, and 5 workers respectively. The left nodes
in each bipartite graph are colored corresponding to their country of origin.
We also assume that each person belongs to one of two possible genders. 60%
of the workers are male and the remaining 40% workers are female. The left
nodes corresponding to the female gender are double the size of male nodes
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in the graphs. It is important to note that when simultaneously maximizing
diversity for two different attributes, these diversities may conflict. A newly
arrived person may increase the gender diversity of the team but not the country
diversity, while another newly arrived person may add to the country diversity
and not gender diversity. In our experiments, we weight these two factors equally
by setting r = 0.5. We also set the edge weights of all workers to all teams to
one, implying that people from all countries and gender are equally good for all
teams.
For people arriving sequentially, one cannot judge an algorithm based on
a single permutation, as it is possible that for a particular sequence of people
the algorithm can perform very well or poorly. For instance, if one male and
one female arrive alternately, a first-come-first-serve algorithm will also give the
most diverse matching for gender. To compensate for differences in arrival order,
we conducted 100 runs with different permutations in which people arrive. We
measure the performance of our algorithm using Gain in Entropy (GiE) and
Price of Diversity (PoD) metrics defined before for each run. The Gain in
Entropy (GiE) for gender (GiEg) and country GiEc are defined separately, to
measure improvements in diversity for both types of attributes. As a baseline,
we use a first-come-first-serve algorithm, which allocates people to teams by
only satisfying the constraints.
For 100 runs, our results show that the random allocation gives an average
gender entropy of 0.521, while average country entropy is 0.906. Average gender
entropy of 0.589 and an average country entropy of 1.119 is obtained from our
algorithm, which are large improvements over the baseline. Note that these
averages are of 100 runs, where each run has 40 teams in them (effectively,
it is an average of forming 4000 teams). We observe that our algorithm gets
more diverse teams for both gender (average GiEg = 1.130) and country
(average GiEc = 1.235). The average Price of Diversity (PoD) of 100 runs
is 1.143. This means that if the baseline algorithm interviewed 100 people to
do the allocation, on average the diverse algorithm interviewed 14 more people.
To explain the results, we next show the improvement for an individual run
(selected randomly).
We consider the permutation of arrival order shown in Fig. 4. One can note
from the differences between baseline and diverse allocation that the number
of people interviewed for baseline was 32 and the number of people interviewed
for diverse matching was 35 (the PoD = 3532 = 1.093). Both cases satisfied
all the constraints and met all team demands. For this run, the gender entropy
and country entropy of the baseline algorithm are 0.473 and 0.977. Using our
diverse matching algorithm, the gender entropy is 0.581 and the country entropy
is 1.150. The baseline allocation had 9 teams (out of 40) which had all people
from different countries. In contrast, our allocation had 21 teams which had all
members from different countries. The baseline allocation had 9 teams where
all people were of the same gender (non-diverse), while our allocation had only
3 such teams. Hence, by interviewing just three extra people, our algorithm led
to large improvements in both gender and country diversity. This shows the
efficacy of diverse matching on multiple attributes and complex constraints.
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Using this complex setting, we showed that our algorithm can show large
improvements over a baseline algorithm. While we did not conduct an additional
experiment comparing the algorithm against a human, manually trying to form
teams, we argue that forming a diverse team for multiple attributes (gender and
country) and satisfying the constraints for all workers and teams is a difficult
task for a person to do manually within a reasonable amount of time. Even
if a person can find a good solution manually, the process will not be efficient
or scalable. For instance, we conducted 100 runs for different arrival orders of
people, effectively forming 4000 teams (15,600 total allocations) within a few
minutes. We can also scale up our experiment to include a much larger example,
doing millions of allocations and incorporate different utilities. These qualities
make algorithmic team formation a necessity in simultaneously forming multiple
diverse teams.
6 Discussion
Our above algorithms provide a scalable way to perform real-time, diverse, team
formation that mirrors some of the constraints of real-world collaborative work
and teams. However, our work leads to many open questions: 1) What kinds
or types of diversity is our approach well- or ill-suited to include? 2) When in
collaborative team formation would one want real-time diverse formation versus
not? And 3) what kinds of diverse team formation tasks or constraints would
limit the approach we outline here?
6.1 Handling different types of diversity
Our above results demonstrated how to form diverse teams which were diverse
with respect to people who were clustered into discrete groups (in our case,
specifically based on demographics). We also showed that the method is generic
in the sense that it can be easily applied to any type of diversity wherein people
can be categorized into a set of groups—whether it is based on demographics,
task-related skills, cognitive preferences, etc. In the supplementary material
[Insert link to Supplemental Material here.], we added an additional experiment
to show how our algorithm can be applied to a real-world application of allocat-
ing reviewers to sequentially arriving journal papers. This demonstrated that
the algorithm is also applicable when the sequentially arriving side is teams.
However, there are two important cases that we do not explicitly handle above:
1) where people can belong to multiple groups/clusters (i.e., where the clusters
are not mutually exclusive) and 2) where there are not discrete clusters but
rather continuous scales or spectra along which people vary.
When people may belong to multiple, non-mutually-exclusive clusters, one
must modify our objective function in Eq. 2 to consider not just the given
weight assigned to that individual’s group-to-team edges, but also other edges
from other groups that the person may belong to. For instance, a person may
have political affiliation as 50% Democrat and 50% Republican. If such a person
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gets matched to a team which tries to maximize the diversity of political views,
then all both groups get credit proportional to the percentage membership of
the person. This increases the computational cost slightly (in that we have to
consider more edges), but does not substantively change the above algorithm or
results.
When people are mapped to a continuous or ordinal spectra (e.g., right-to-
left leaning, etc.) rather than in groups (e.g., Democrat or Republican, etc.),
diversity is often cast as a type of area, volume, or density coverage over a
space. This changes the objective function—for example, using Determinantal
Point Processes [36] instead of entropy over groups. In such cases, our greedy
algorithm remains the same so long as the coverage function is submodular, but
estimating OPT is more challenging. Methods for doing so are a fruitful area
for future research.
6.2 Under what conditions would one want diverse team
selection?
Theoretically, our proposed method applies to any situation where people belong
to different groups and we want even coverage of those groups (e.g., in team
membership). However, practically, there are two important factors to consider.
First is the price of encouraging diversity, especially in skewed distributions. In
our simulated and human experiments, when some of the clusters or groups were
quite rare, it was possible that requiring diverse matching rejected many people
(while waiting for a person from a rare group to arrive). This rejection can have
a non-trivial cost (e.g., when interviewing people), which may affect the total
budget. In such cases, one must balance the cost of rejection with the skewness
of the applicant pool. If the cost of rejection is high or there are few applicants
from a given cluster/group, then diverse matching can become expensive. In
some situations, however, this higher cost may be worth the commensurate
benefits of a diverse team.
Second, understanding that benefit-cost trade-off is central to knowing when
and how to apply automated diverse team formation. Diversity is often por-
trayed as a “double-edged sword” in contemporary organizational theory [26].
At one end of the spectrum, proponents stress how heterogeneity helps team
outcomes, while opponents posit that heterogeneous teams may lead to dys-
functional interactions or sub-optimal performance. Different researchers who
study collaborative work have looked at diversity from the lens of creative out-
put [58, 59], team satisfaction [60] or tie formation [61] etc. Although teams are
routinely assembled from individuals with varying degrees of demographic and
cognitive abilities, it is still an open question as to under what conditions het-
erogeneous composition leads to groups which outperform homogeneous teams
[24]. While the answers to those questions lie beyond the scope of this paper,
our proposed method complements existing research on the benefits of diversity
by allowing one to mathematically study whether balancing one type of diver-
sity might be useful for a domain. For example, by calculating the “price of
diversity,” our method helps researchers in quantifying the impact of diversity
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on real-time team formation or other real-time matching problems.
As an example, consider two tasks. Task 1 requires a team to craft policies
for an important national issue, while Task 2 requires the team to jointly write
a review for the movie “Titanic.” Assume that the manager wants to maximize
diversity with respect to political affiliation (Democrats, Republicans, Indepen-
dent, Others) for these two teams. As in our simulation studies, one can use
population estimates to calculate the expected price of diversity. For instance,
we observed a PoD# of 4.25 on Amazon Turk. This means, to form a team
of 4 people for this task, we expect to reject another 13 people. Getting this
estimate and comparing it to a firm’s costs and internal values illuminates the
pros or cons of political affiliation diversity in each team. For the first task,
opinions from diverse political viewpoints will make the policy stronger and
may be worth the rejection costs. On the other hand, current research does not
indicate that political diversity substantially benefits dramatic movie review
writing, and thus may not be worth the rejection cost. In such cases, the firm
can decide whether more research is needed to establish the benefit or not. Our
method can be adapted to estimate the trade-off between the total cost of team
formation and the utility gained by forming diverse teams.
6.3 Limitations of diverse team formation
From the simulations provided, one may wonder why a computational method is
needed at all. Can diverse matching just be done manually? For a small number
of teams and clusters, where all team members are equally qualified for the tasks,
it is possible to form diverse teams manually. However, when the constraints
are more complex (e.g., different tasks have different demands, multiple clusters
exist, and different people have different utility) it quickly becomes impossible
for a human to select diverse teams. In such cases, our diverse team formation
method applies.
Another important implication of our research lies in a better understand-
ing of team member utility. In our simulations, we assumed that we already
knew the edge weights or the utility that a person offers to all the tasks. In
practice, it is non-trivial to estimate that utility and a large body of research
have looked into estimating a person’s task utility [62]. Future research direc-
tions can look at this problem holistically, to estimate utility for diverse teams.
One interesting direction would be integrating real-time diverse team formation
with simultaneous utility assessment (e.g., based on worker accuracy in crowd
markets).
Likewise, one must estimate a person’s cluster or group. This paper used
demographic groups but our method allows groups based on any factor. With
some modification to the objective function, it is possible to allow multiple group
membership too. However, defining groups in itself are non-trivial for some
applications, and a person’s group, affiliations, or characteristics may change
over time. These questions complement our line of work and would be interesting
areas for future research.
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6.4 Extensions beyond team formation
Thus far, we have discussed how to form diverse, collaborative teams. However,
team formation can benefit from diversity in two different ways—by joint team
effort or just by aggregating individual efforts. For the former, organizational
research has investigated many factors where diversity may benefit team output.
However, a less obvious application of diverse team formation is the scenario
where the team members work independently. In such cases, one expects to
benefit from aggregating their individual outputs to form a collective output.
Conference or journal paper reviewing is one example of this situation, where
reviewers are not necessarily collaborating together, but aggregating reviews
from diverse viewpoints will benefit a paper more than those from the same
viewpoint. Diverse matching also applies to such broader definitions of team
tasks. For instance, many online design communities expect participants to also
review and critique each others’ designs [63, 64]. By matching diverse sets of
individuals to each design, one can expect to get reviews from different view-
points. Real-time matching is necessary in this case as people arrive randomly
over time and need a subset of designs to review. Similar issues arise in network
science and formation as well, such as the preferential attachment problem.
7 Conclusions & Future Research
We presented an algorithm for assigning sequentially arriving people from dif-
ferent groups to teams—real-time diverse matching. We show that by using a
low-cost screening task, one can group people and then allocate them to teams
as they arrive while balancing the team diversity. While we clustered people
into groups based on demographics, our method is generic and can be applied to
other attributes like expertise. Our method also applies to other real-time allo-
cation tasks where diversity of viewpoints might matter: e.g., real-time worker-
to-team assignments, journal paper-reviewer assignments, and intelligence anal-
ysis tasks. Future work could include: 1) journal paper-review assignments
where both the static and dynamic side of the bipartite graph are clustered;
2) latent or non-mutually exclusive cluster labels/attributes; and 3) combining
real-time diverse matching with real-time cluster identification using Bayesian
techniques [65].
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Table 3: Table of notation
Parameters Description Values in
Sec. 5.1
G , Bipartite graph
P , Set of vertices that arrive sequentially (e.g. people)
T , Set of all vertices known apriori (e.g. teams)
E , Set of all edges
S , A feasible team allocation
yk,j , Number of people from cluster k, allocated to team j
f(Sj) , Objective function value for a set of people matched to a team j
∆f(S, e) , Marginal gain on adding edge e to set S, which is f(S ∪ e)− f(S)
Sj , Subset of edges in a matching that are incident to vertex j
Pk , Set of people that belong to cluster k
N , Number of teams to be formed 10
M , Maximum number of people that can arrive sequentially 100
K , Number of clusters into which nodes arriving sequentially are parti-
tioned
3
b(i) , Maximum number of edges that can be matched to each node (team or
people)
3
R+ , Maximum people that can be matched to each team 3
L+ , Maximum teams that can be matched to each person N/A
wi,j , Utility of person i for team j 1.0
d , Total number of knapsack constraints 10
ce,jj , Cardinality cost of an edge e (from person i to team j) for each con-
straint
1
dfR− , R
−th highest marginal gain among all clusters 1.0
cBi,j , Payment to a person i for team j after acceptance N/A
cSi , Cost of interviewing a person i N/A
B , Total budget of a firm hiring people N/A
OPT ∗ , Optimal utility for offline matching 30.0
α , An algorithm parameter between 0 to 1, which determines the marginal
gain cutoff
1.0
v , A value selected between αOPT∗ and OPT∗ 30.0
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